The closed-end fund discount anomaly is widely cited as proof of the importance of investor irrationality in determining asset prices. We show, however, that the discount's primary features can arise entirely from the tradeoff between managers' ability and the fees they charge. In particular, we derive a parsimonious rational model in which funds usually trade at a discount, but they are issued at or above par. The model requires only that managers have (imperfectly observable) ability to generate excess returns; that they sign long-term contracts guaranteeing them a fee each year equal to a fixed fraction of assets under management; and that they can leave to earn more money elsewhere if they turn out to be good. JEL classification: G14.
Introduction
There is perhaps no empirical regularity cited more often as evidence of investor irrationality than the discount at which closed-end funds trade relative to their net asset value (NAV). Boudreaux (1973) and Malkiel (1977) first pointed out that the existence of discounts and premia can, in principle, be explained by the tradeoff between managers' ability and the fees they charge. If managers add enough ability to outweigh their fees, funds should trade at a premium. If not, funds should trade at a discount. In support of this hypothesis, Chay and Trzcinka (1999) find that discounts and premia on closed-end equity funds predict future managerial performance. However, prior authors have been unable to use this same tradeoff to explain why funds that generally trade at a discount are also issued at or above par. Chay and Trzcinka (1999) conclude that "The investor sentiment hypothesis of the formation of closed-end funds appears to be the only plausible explanation for the initial public offering (see Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) )." Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) note that for the cost/ability tradeoff to explain both the usual discount and the premium at the IPO, investors must expect superior returns at the IPO, but then (predictably) later expect poor performance, and they conclude that "Logic suggests that it is impossible for both predictions to be rational...." Most recent research has therefore looked for non-rational explanations for the discount, despite the fact that the discount in the UK (where the vast majority of closed-end funds are held by institutions 1 ) behaves very like that in the US.
Our major contribution to this literature is to show that, when combined with the labor market insights of Harris and Holmstrom (1982) , the managerial performance hypothesis can simultaneously explain both the usual existence of discounts and the fact that funds are issued at or above par. Our aim is not to argue that irrational beliefs or other behavioral factors are not important. Explaining every detail of the discount's behavior is a complicated undertaking, and will no doubt require an equally complicated model. Our goal is rather to develop a simple rational model that explains the primary characteristics of the discount. Future researchers can use this model as a benchmark to help identify which regularities are more likely to be evidence of investor irrationality, and can add additional features to capture the more detailed behavior of the discount.
In their influential survey of the literature, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) identify the main empirical regularities exhibited by the discount:
1. Closed-end funds are issued at (or above) their NAV, more often than not start trading at a premium to NAV, and then decline.
anticipate this behavior, and so expect a closed-end fund to move into discount after its issue date. Investors are still willing to invest at NAV on the IPO because the fee the manager charges is less than the value he is expected to add. In expectation, the additional value added by the manager is exactly cancelled by the expected growth in the discount, and investors get a fair return. This paper is closely related to the Berk and Green (2002) model of open-end mutual fund management. Both papers use the same economic idea -competition between investors drives the expected returns on an investment fund to the competitive level -but its application to closed-end funds is very different. In Berk and Green (2002) , the price of the (open-end) fund is forced to equal NAV at the end of each day. Competition between investors cannot, therefore, change the price of the fund, but instead causes cash in-and out-flows to and from the fund, which drive the returns on the fund to the competitive level. This explains the observed relation between open-end mutual fund flows and performance. With closed-end funds there are no cash in-or out-flows from the fund, but the price is not fixed. Thus, while the assets under management remain fixed, competition between investors causes the fund's price to change until the return is again driven to the competitive level. Taken together, the papers show that two different, widely recognized, empirical puzzlesthe flow of funds/performance relation in open funds and the discounts of closed-end funds -can both be explained by the same economic fundamentals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews other explanations for the closed-end fund discount. Section 3 develops the formal model, and Section 4 investigates the model's empirical implications. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Prior Explanations for the Closed-End Fund Discount
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A number of explanations for the closed-end fund discount have been proposed that are based on market frictions such as illiquidity and taxes. If a fund owns a lot of restricted stock, or other illiquid assets, which do not trade freely, its NAV may not accurately reflect its true value, in which case the fact that it does not trade at its NAV is not particularly surprising. Malkiel (1977) and Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) find that holdings of restricted stock do have some explanatory power for discounts, but these holdings are small or zero for most funds, so cannot fully explain the behavior of the discount. Seltzer (1989) suggests that funds holding illiquid assets are likely to be overvalued, but this is inconsistent with the fact that funds' price rises when they are open-ended.
Full taxes on a fund's realized capital gains are paid by current shareholders even if most of the gains occurred before they bought their shares. This would imply that funds with large accumulated gains should trade at a discount to NAV. However, Malkiel (1977) finds that even a fund with (a very high) 25% of its assets in unrealized appreciation would see an average discount of only 5%, and moreover the fact that prices rise to NAV on fund liquidation suggests that this factor cannot be the main factor driving discounts. Brickley, Manaster, and Schallheim (1991) and Kim (1994) suggest an alternative taxtiming explanation based on the idea that holding shares indirectly via a closed-end fund precludes an investor from doing the direct trading in the underlying shares necessary to follow the optimal tax timing strategy.
7 The empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Kim (1994) documents a large increase in the number of closed-end funds after 1986, when changes in the tax-law reduced the tax disadvantage of holding closed-end funds, but DeLong, Bradford, and Shleifer (1992) document that the discount increased between 1985 and 1990. In addition, the tax-timing option cannot explain funds trading at a premium, and should apply to both open and closed-end funds. Besides frictions, the other main explanations that have been suggested for the discount are fees and managerial ability. The idea that a closed-end fund will trade for a discount if the manager charges fees (but does not add value) was originally proposed by Boudreaux (1973) . If managers charge fees, and provide nothing of value in return, then the value of the fund to investors should be lower than the fund's NAV. Gemmill and Thomas (2002) , Ross (2002a), and Cherkes (2003b) show that if the fund pays out a fraction γ to investors each year, and pays fractional management fees of δ each year, the discount is
In particular, if the payout rate to investors is zero, the discount is 100% regardless of how small the fractional fee paid to managers each year. 8 Empirically, Malkiel (1977) did not find that fees significantly explained variation in the level of the discount, although Kumar and Noronha (1992) find that differences in fees do explain a small proportion of the crosssectional variation in discounts. The main drawback of this explanation is that it cannot, alone, explain why closed-end funds trade at a discount, while open-end funds with similar 7 See, for example, Constantinides (1983 Constantinides ( , 1984 . 8 A simple way to see this intuitively is to think of the fund manager as being awarded a fraction δ of the shares remaining in the fund each year. After t years, investors are left with (1 − δ) t times the number of shares they started with, which goes to zero as t → ∞. fees trade at NAV. Nor can it explain why closed-end funds are issued at or above their NAV. We will argue in this paper that it is not variation in fees, but rather variation in managerial ability that explains cross-sectional variation in discounts.
If some managers add value, a fund will trade at a discount if investors believe its manager is relatively poor at investing their money (so they do not make back their fees), and at a premium if investors believe the manager is relatively good at investing. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) point out that for this to explain the usual overall discount, together with the premium at the IPO, investors must expect superior returns at the IPO, but then (predictably) later expect poor performance. Our model predicts exactly this behavior for the return on the fund's underlying assets. However, when this is combined with the timeseries behavior of the discount, investors in the fund's shares always receive the fair rate of return, consistent with the results of Sias, Starks, and Tiniç (2001) .
There are two explanations closely related to ours, in that they attempt simultaneously to explain both the issue price and the subsequent discount - Ross (2002b); and Arora, Ju, and Ou-Yang (2003) . Like us, Ross derives a dynamic rational model of closed-end funds that explains the post-IPO discounts as a function of the difference between the value added by the manager and the fees charged. Initially, on the IPO, investors are asymmetrically informed about the quality of the manager, and because of the idiosyncrasies of the IPO process, this information is not revealed until after the issue. Hence the fund can be issued at NAV. Although we derive many of same implications, Ross' model differs from ours in a number of important respects. We do not appeal to an information asymmetry -all of our participants are symmetrically informed. Hence, our explanation for why the fund is issued at NAV does not rely on the idiosyncrasies of the IPO process itself. In addition, Ross (2002b) does not examine the implication of a long term labor contract on the fund's performance. Consequently, that paper cannot explain the predictable increase in the discount after the IPO, an important contribution of this paper. Ross does not model the intertemporal rational expectations equilibrium and so does not make an inference about the dynamic behavior of the post offering price relative to the pre offering price. However, to be consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium, investors cannot be fooled, so their expectation of the post offering price must be realized on average. In Ross' model this implies that to induce them to participate, on average, the post offering price must equal the pre offering price. Arora et al. (2003) use a two period model to explain the behavior of the closed-end discount. Although they use a different mechanism to us (managers have inside information that they exploit), they show that, under certain conditions, closed-end funds will be issued at a premium and will, with certainty, fall into discount. However that paper cannot explain the wide variation in the discount across funds, nor can it explain the time series behavior of the discount. In particular there is no mechanism in the model that would explain why a fund that is trading at a discount could move to a premium. Cherkes (2003b) independently develops a related model in which the discount is determined by investors' tradeoff between fees paid and the additional liquidity benefits that accrue through holding the closed-end fund rather than owning the underlying assets directly. Incorporating a liquidity factor allows the model to explain why discounts on related funds tend to move together, something we do not attempt to explain. However, his model does not explain the predictable widening of the discount following the fund's IPO.
The Model
Although Section 1 communicated the basic intuition of our model, it says nothing about the size of the effects. To see whether the intuition we describe can produce discounts of the same order of magnitude as observed, this section develops a formal model of closed-end fund management and investment, based on the open-end fund model in Berk and Green (2002) . Our intention is to build a parsimonious model of closed-end funds that captures the salient features of the data, rather than to model every idiosyncrasy of the industry. For instance, the typical labor contract in the industry is very much like a CEO's labor contract -the manager serves at the will of board of directors. How this translates into the tenure of a manager is a complicated question and beyond the scope of this paper. Past research has found that proxy contests are rare, and managers are very rarely fired, 9 so we will simply assume that a manager cannot be fired and can, at his or her own discretion, manage the fund until time T when the assets of the fund are distributed to shareholders. 10 We will refer to this date as the open date of the fund. Closed-end funds do not in practice have a fixed open date. We could alternatively model the opening of the fund via, for example, some Poisson process with a fixed arrival rate. This would not substantially alter the behavior of the discount near the IPO. The advantage of choosing a fixed open date is that it allows us to use the same model to study the behavior of the discount in both of the periods prior research has identified as important -just after the IPO, and just before the fund is opened. Assume the (continuously-compounded) return generated by the manager is given by
wherer t is the return on the (observable) portfolio held at the start of the period,
r t does not necessarily equalr t as the manager adds value by selecting stocks, so the portfolio composition changes over time. ξ t is an i.i.d. normal random variable with mean zero and precision ζ, representing the volatility of the assets in the fund at the beginning of the period, and r is the expected return on these assets. t is an i.i.d. normal random variable, independent of ξ t and any risk factor in the economy (it is purely idiosyncratic uncertainty), with mean zero and precision ω = 1/σ 2 , representing the effect of unobservable changes in portfolio composition during the period. If the manager's skill level, α, is positive (negative) the manager earns an average return greater (less) than the expected return on the portfolio at the beginning of the period. The manager charges a proportional fee, c, per period, so the fund's net asset value at time t, NAV t , evolves as follows:
Consider a manager who begins managing the fund in period τ . Neither investors nor the manager know the value of α, the manager's skill level. They both have the same prior on α at time τ -normal with mean φ τ and precision γ = 1/η 2 . After observing the returns the manager generates, investors and managers alike update their priors. Let φ t denote the mean of the posterior distribution at time t, that is, the expectation of α conditional on seeing all returns up to and including r t , i.e.
The evolution of the priors is governed by:
Proposition 1 At time t, the posterior distribution of α is a normal distribution with mean φ t and variance
, where φ t is the solution to
Proof: Follows directly from DeGroot (1970) (Theorem 1, p. 167).
The manager generates an excess return equal to r t+1 −r t+1 . By the result above, its mean and variance are given by
The conditional mean and variance of φ t+1 then follow directly:
Although the manager cannot be fired, we do allow him or her to leave the fund. In reality, managers will quit (or successfully negotiate a pay raise) when they have a more lucrative outside offer. Rather than explicitly model the arrival of these offers, we will simply assume that if the manager's ability φ t rises above some levelφ, he is offered more lucrative employment elsewhere and quits. Clearlyφ ≥ φ τ (otherwise he would never choose to be a closed-end fund manager).
Assume the manager gets a fixed amount of capital to invest at time 0, and that no additional capital enters or leaves the fund until the open date, T , when the proceeds are distributed to the shareholders at net asset value. For convenience, assume that all dividends are reinvested in the fund. Competition between investors implies that, in equilibrium, they cannot earn an expected return greater than r by investing in the fund. Since they are rational, they will not accept an expected return lower than r, so their expected return from investing in the fund must always exactly equal r. Since the expected return the manager generates, after fees, will in general not equal r, the only way this can occur is if the price of the fund adjusts so that it is not equal to the NAV.
Write the price of the closed-end fund at time t as P τ t (NAV t , φ t ), where the current manager started with the fund at time τ , and has current estimated ability φ t . Define
the price of the fund expressed as a fraction of NAV. The discount is then 1 − D τ t (φ t ). At the open date, T , the assets are distributed to investors so
If the fund were issued at a premium (because the fee charged is less than the value added by the manager), the manager would have an incentive to quit the fund once it was established and start a new fund, since part of his compensation is paid up front in the form of the premium. Consequently, investors would not bid the price up to the full capitalized value. This is costly to the manager, so one would expect him to set the fee at a level where the fund would not trade at a premium. Similarly, if the fund were issued at a discount (because the fee charged is more than the value added by the manager), the manager would in effect be choosing to defer compensation. Assuming managers are cash constrained (otherwise there would be no reason for them to market their skill to outside investors), this would not be a preferred outcome from their point of view, so one would expect the fund to be issued at NAV. We therefore assume that the fund is initially sold for its NAV:
When φ t ≥φ the old manager quits, a new manager is hired at the same fee, and the fund will again trade at its NAV. This condition pins down the ability level of the new manager hired at time τ , φ τ , and implies that
The following proposition derives the price of the fund as a function of φ, the perceived quality of the manager, and the manager's tenure: 
Empirical Implications of the Model
This section calibrates the model to the data using results from prior research, and shows that it generates the four empirical regularities listed by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) , with magnitudes comparable to those observed by previous researchers. Our objective in this section is not to argue that the model can explain every detail of the closed-end fund puzzle, but rather to show that the four most important features of the closed-end fund discount can be produced by a parsimonious rational model.
Calibration
We begin with ω, the precision of the difference between the return of the fund and the return of the underlying assets held at the beginning of the period. Using US data (1965-85) Pontiff (1997) reports a mean monthly variance across funds of the percentage difference between these two returns equal to 37.33. Adams (2000) finds a value of 11.50 for UK funds . As Adams (2000) points out, Pontiff's data cover a particularly volatile period. More recently the US has been much closer to the U.K. experience. Furthermore, the distribution of funds' volatilities is highly skewed -Pontiff reports a median of only 19.62. In light of this we set ω = 33. Expressed on a monthly basis for percentage returns, this translates into a variance of about 25, somewhat less than Pontiff's mean (but still larger than his median). Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) report that management fees typically range between 0.5% and 2% per year. We use 1%. Since we do not endogenously model management departure, we must pick an open end date. We choose 10 years.
The remaining three parameters, the prior mean, φ 0 , and precision, γ, and the level at which the manager quits,φ, are not directly observable. Instead we infer their values by experimenting with parameters that would give realistic values for the average discount and maximum premium. Table 1 summarizes the final choice of parameters. Note that these values of φ 0 and γ imply, at least initially, that 63% of managers have enough skill to make back what they charge in fees, and since the average manager initially has an α of 6.2% but only charges a 1% fee, his initial excess returns are substantially higher than the fees he charges. As the plots show, for low value of φ, the relation between ability and the discount is intuitive -a positive change in ability translates into higher expected returns which lead to smaller discounts (D increases). This relation is documented empirically by Chay and Trzcinka (1999) . However, at high enough levels of φ, the discount and ability are inversely related, so an increase in ability translates into an increase in the discount (or, equivalently, a decrease in the premium or a lower value of D). The reason for this behavior is that greater ability implies a higher likelihood that the manager will quit, either now or in the near future (when φ hitsφ), to be replaced with a manager of lower ability. Note that the nonmonotonicity does not only occur at the point φ =φ. For example, for a tenure of 6 years, the graph slopes downwards before the jump. This is because, in this region, as ability increases, even though it is not high enough to cause the manager to leave immediately, it makes it more likely that he will leave in the near future. The fact that there is a region where D(·) is decreasing is interesting because it potentially could contribute to an empirical phenomenon past researchers have found puzzling. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Ross (2002b) find that the empirical relation between past performance and the discount is negative -when funds outperform the market, the discount subsequently increases. As Figure 1 makes clear, good current performance need not translate into future outperformance if the result is that the manager gets an outside offer of employment. Although not part of our model, extremely bad performance might not translate into future underperformance if the resulting update on managerial ability is enough to motivate dissatisfied shareholders to mount a proxy fight to terminate the fund. Potentially, these two effects might explain the empirical puzzle, although evaluating their importance is clearly beyond the scope of the current paper. Figure 2 shows the initial ability of a newly hired manager as a function of the number of years until the fund's open date. The first manager hired (when the open date is 10 years in the future) has an initial ability of 6.2%. Note that this value is well in excess of the fee (1%). The reason for this is that the long term labor contract offers insurance. The cost of this insurance can be inferred from the dotted line, which shows the ability level of a manager who can never quit the fund.
11 The large difference between the two values (6.9% for the first manager) reflects the value of the insurance. Investors demand much higher qualified managers knowing that the bad ones will become entrenched. This difference shrinks as the number of years to the open date decreases, as Figure 2 shows. When the manager cannot quit, the required initial ability of the manager rises because the benefit derived from the skewness of the log normal distribution is reduced. Concomitantly, the length of the insurance contract decreases, so the required initial ability of a manager who is free to quit decreases. Consequently the two curves in Figure 2 converge to each other. 
Evolution of the Average Discount
Three of the four empirical regularities listed by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) concern the behavior of the discount of the average fund. In this section we will derive investors' expectations of this behavior within our model, and show that they expect to see exactly the regularities observed in practice.
To compute the expected discount at some point in the future, we will compute the distribution of managerial ability at that time, and then use the relation between the discount and managerial ability derived in Section 3. The distribution of future managerial ability is determined both by investors updating on performance and by managerial turnover. First define
Note that R t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance Φ 
It will often be simpler to work with the improper p.d.f. and c.d.f.,
Lemma 1 in Appendix A provides expressions relating the proper and improper forms, and Lemma 2 derives explicit representations for f φτ ,τ t (φ) andf φτ ,τ t (φ). The next proposition derives the expected discount.
Proposition 3 The expected discount, at time t, of a fund that started at time 0 with open date T is
where G 
with the boundary condition H 0 = 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.2. Figure 3 plots the expected value of the price of the fund, expressed as % NAV, as a function of the age of the fund. The fund is issued at par with an open-end date 10 years in the future. Initially, the expected discount increases over time, since the expected quality of the manager declines -good managers leave, while bad managers become entrenched. The total capitalized value dissipated by a poor manager depends how long the manager will be with the fund. As we approach the open date, even a very poor manager does not have time to hurt investors much, and the price must converge back to NAV.
The plot reproduces three of the four empirical regularities enumerated by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) : The fund is issued at par and is expected to fall into discount; it is expected always to trade at a discount; and this discount is expected to disappear as the fund approaches its open-date. The overall level of the discount is similar to that observed in the data. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) analyze US funds between 1965 and 1985, and report that discounts towards the end of this period tend to be between 10% and 20%. From 1980-98, the average discount on US stock funds varied from about 0-20%, 12 and discounts at the end of the 1990s were around 10% in the UK and 5% in the US. Anderson and Born (2002) report that in February 2001 the average discount for all equity funds (worldwide) was 10.9%. Note also that the expected discount grows quite rapidly -the price drops to 91% of NAV after only 1 year. This fast initial decline is also observed in practice. For example, Weiss (1989) finds that after just twelve weeks the average discount for US stock funds in her sample is just over 2%, and after 24 weeks it is 10%.
Distribution of the Discount
Only one of the four regularities listed by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) remains to be explained -the wide dispersion in discounts across funds. In this section we will investigate the model's implications for the cross-sectional distribution of discounts.
To compute the distribution of the discount at some point in the future, we will combine the distribution of managerial ability, f 
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% NAV dispersion in discounts. For example for a manager who has been at the fund for 4 years, the probability that the discount will be over 55% (the price, expressed at a % of NAV being less than 45%) is over 20%. Yet there is still a 20% probability of the fund trading at a premium. Significant dispersion in funds' discounts occurs very early in practice. For example, Weiss (1989) finds that after 24 weeks, while the average discount of the 22 US stock funds she studies is 10%, two of the funds still trade at a premium. Figure 4 shows that 20% of funds trade at a premium at the end of the first year. In addition, Thompson (1978) notes that discounts in excess of "20% are quite frequent, with discounts exceeding 30 and 40% not uncommon," consistent with our model. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) point out that in order for a model with differential management ability to generate the observed time series behavior of average discounts, investors must systematically expect management performance to decline over time. Our model predicts exactly this behavior.
NAV return
Investors' expectations of managerial ability can be measured by the excess expected return on the fund's NAV. Let
be the (gross) realized NAV return. Conditional on information available at time t, and using standard properties of the lognormal distribution, Equations (6) and (7) tell us that the expected time-t NAV return for the first manager of the fund is
This is higher than the fair return if
that is, if
Therefore define the continuously compounded excess NAV return as
Investors' expectations of the future performance of the fund's initial manager are given by
Figure 5 plots this expectation as a function of managerial tenure, t. The parameters used are given in Table 1 . The NAV return is initially expected to outperform the benchmark (the return on the assets held at the beginning of the period), but as the tenure of the manager increases, it is expected to underperform. With our calibrated parameters, this deterioration in performance is very rapid -underperformance occurs by the second year of the manager's tenure. This is because, at these parameter values, investors learn about managerial ability very quickly. Hence, most good managers leave early, accounting for the rapid decline in expected NAV returns. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) summarize the finance profession's understanding of the closed-end fund puzzle by listing four main empirical regularities exhibited by the discount on these funds. In this paper we show that all four of these empirical regularities can be generated by a simple, parsimonious rational model. Note that our results depend strongly on the form of the labor contract. For example, suppose that, instead of signing long-term contracts, managers' pay changes each period so that managers are always paid exactly what they are worth. In this case, good managers would not have an incentive to quit, bad managers would not be overpaid, and the fund would always trade at its NAV. However, Harris and Holmstrom (1982) show that such a contract would be suboptimal if managers are risk-averse, since they would be subject to the risk that they might later turn out to have low ability.
Conclusions
Our model makes several new empirical predictions, primarily relating to the impact of managerial turnover. First, new funds (and funds that have recently had a change in management) should exhibit above normal NAV returns. Second, consistent with our model, the existing evidence is that discounts narrow during proxy fights. However, there is as yet no evidence on the behavior of the discount around a voluntary management departure. Our model suggests that only good managers would be willing to leave voluntarily so that the discount ought to increase around separations that are not caused by a proxy fight. Finally, although not explicitly derived in the paper, our model predicts that the volatility of the discount should decrease as managerial tenure increases.
Our objective in this paper is to explain the primary empirical regularities outlined by Lee et al. (1990) , using the simplest possible model in order to focus clearly on the interplay between managerial ability, fees, and the labor contract. Consequently there are many empirical regularities that our model as outlined cannot explain, but it would be simple to add additional features in order to do so. For example, there is evidence that changes in the discounts on closed-end funds exhibit cross-sectional correlation, particularly within funds of a given type (see Lee et al. (1991) ). While our model does predict variation in the discount, it does not exhibit this correlation. However, the model of Cherkes (2003b) does (although it does not explain the predictable widening of the discount after the IPO). It uses the tradeoff between fees and liquidity to explain the discount, and exhibits cross-sectional correlation in the discount because the liquidity of different funds in a given sector tends to move together. Adding a similar liquidity factor to our model would allow it to exhibit this cross-sectional correlation, while still retaining its ability to explain the main regularities cited above.
Perhaps the most important implication of our paper comes not from what it can explain, but rather from what it cannot. Although questioned by Cherkes (2003a) , there is some evidence (see Weiss (1989) ) that investors who buy closed-end fund shares at or near the IPO earn predictably negative risk-adjusted returns. Our model does not exhibit this behavior, and it could not easily be generated by a simple extension of the model. 13 Although Sias, Starks, and Tiniç (2001) find that, on average, investors in closed-end funds earn competitive returns, Pontiff (1995) shows that closed-end fund premia can be used to predict future abnormal returns to investors. Since the assumption of competitive capital markets lies at the core of our model, it is hard to see how a simple extension of our model could account for predictability in risk adjusted returns. Our paper therefore suggests that researchers should focus on explaining these particular aspects of the closed-end fund puzzle, rather than the more commonly analyzed behavior of the discount.
Differentiating this with respect to φ yields Equation (26), and this in conjunction with Equations (24) yields Equation (25). Finally, Equations (8) and (9) tell us immediately that
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
First, from Equation 5 it is simple to show that φ t+1 =φ when r t+1 = r * t+1 (φ t ), defined by
Thus, whenever r t+1 ≥ r * t+1 (φ t ), the fund will trade for NAV t+1 in period t + 1. Competitive investors must all earn the fair rate of return, r, in equilibrium, so the price of the fund today is the expected value of the price tomorrow, discounted at r. This can be split into two pieces, as
from Equations (8) and (9). Similarly,
From Equation (3) we have
where the fourth line follows from the independence of ξ t and t , and the last line follows from a well-known property of the lognormal distribution [see (Ingersoll, 1987, p.14) ] and the last line uses (27). Substituting (29), (30) and (31) into (28) yields −c n( φ − φ t Φ t ) dφ, the last line following from Equation (27). Independence of r follows by inspection.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Let G φτ ,τ t be the probability that a manager who starts with a fund at time τ leaves the fund at time t. Then, from the definition off (35) where the integral is the contribution to the expectation if the manager does not leave in period t (i.e., if φ t <φ), and the second term accounts for the possibility that the manager will leave in period t, in which case the discount will automatically reset to 1. Also, 
Combining these results and summing across τ , E 0 (D t ) = 
.
Proof: Iterating Equation (5), φ t+s is the sum of normal random variables, so is itself normal. From Equation ( 
